mozart
02-01-2007, 07:28 AM
How the unsung heroes of the Vakarai battle fought in the thick jungles in the east...
As far as fighting the separatist insurgency is concerned what Sri Lankan military planners were accustomed to was a big push in to the enemy territory, supported by heavy armours and tanks. Several brigades, sometimes even a division of soldiers were involved in the mission, which fought along the Main Supply Routes. Operation Riviresa which captured Jaffna and Operation Jayasikuru - abandoned after heavy casualties over the Alpha 9 highway- are two recent examples. They were of the conventional warfare. They had their success and failures. But, the nature of such operations risked soldiers heavily in to the indirect fire by the Tigers. 81mm mortar has been the main form of security forces casualties since the Operation Riviresa.
But, the military mission which successfully captured the last Tiger bastion in the East, Vakarai did not have any of those characteristics. It did not have a name tag either. It did not come out with daily casualty counts. Its very nature of implementation made it hard to seek political mileage - Indeed, the Rajapaksa Administration has restrained itself from politicising the military missions, an obvious shift from its predecessor, the Kumarathunga Administration.
But as Special Forces commandos and soldiers of 6 and 7 Gemunu Watch captured the coastal strip of Vakarai, Kathiravelu and Verugal, resulting in the collapse of the last strong hold of the LTTE in the East, the military mission suddenly made headlines.
Cache of arms
As far as the cache of arms recovered by the troops and the number of LTTE casualties concerned, the military mission is a one of the best success story. More about that later in the article.
Only a few knew when the military mission was launched on November 1, last year.
The mission had three main objectives: 1.Zero casualties to the civilians. 2. Minimum Casualties to the Security Forces 3. Maximum casualties to the enemy.
The mission was planned in order to achieve these triple objectives. Security Forces restrained its fire power, in most incidents where the civilians could be caught in indirect fire in the form of Multi-Barrel Rockets and artillery. Other than the tragedy in Vigneshwaran Vidyalam, Kathiravelu, where a misguided observatory rocket fire targeting a movement of a Tiger artillery gun fell near the IDP camp, the security forces almost succeeded minimising civilian casualties.
The second doctrine: Indirect fire has been the cause for the greater number of military casualties during the previous military operations. The concentration of a large number of troops in a smaller area made them easy victims of indirect fire. So the second doctrine intended to cut down casualties by indirect fire. Small group operations were the best form to avoid indirect fire.
Special Forces Commandos and Special Operation troops with the cache of weapons captured by the Tigers.
The third doctrine: Maximum casualties to the enemy intended to `destroy` the LTTE`s strength in the East. Past experience was that the Tigers could withdraw in the face of advancing troops and that later would regroup and attack. Had the troops opted for a conventional military operation in the coastal strip of Vakarai, the withdrawing Tigers could have plenty of room to flee the East, via jungle routes, possibly towing big guns with them. There were several past military missions launched to capture and consolidate Vakarai, all of them captured Vakarai in a matter of days. Though they captured the ground, they could not neutralise the enemy man power in significant numbers.
So the military planners decided on a gradual strangulation of the Tigers. The strategy was to delay the final decisive blow, till the Tigers strength is drastically reduced through covert and over attacks, almost all executed by the Special Forces Commandos and soldiers of 6 and 7 GW soldiers who trained in special operations, who operated in small teams deep inside enemy territory.
This Special Operations Infantry training was the brain child of Lt. Gen Sarath Fonseka, who marshalled the idea and trained several intakes when he was the Security Forces Commander, Jaffna.
The absence of a quick decisive blow gave temptation to the Tigers to hold on the ground. The LTTE on its part overestimated its clout and misjudged the military strategy and planned to fight a conventional war in its Eastern front.
The military strategy was of a multi-phased nature. As the first step, it intended to deny the freedom of movement inside Tiger controlled area for LTTE cadres in general and the leadership in particular. Special Force Commandos operating in small groups ambushed Tiger convoys.
In early November, the SF commandos sneaked through their forward defence lines in Kajuwatta. They concentrated their attacks on Karuvappalchanai and Madurankerny Kulam. Convoys of LTTE cadres were blown up in claymore explosions. Tiger administrative and communication centres were attacked. Their supply routes were cut off.
In the second leg of the mission, having disrupted the LTTE machinery in the area, SF commandos, moving from two directions - from Kajuwatta and Mahindapura attacked the Tiger positions in Trikonamadu and Kaddimuravikulam.
It was during that time, that a team of Commandos blew up the Double Cab of the second in Command in charge of the Tiger hierarchy in the East, Arivu in the South of Kathiravelu.
Casualties
According to military sources about 8 senior Tiger military leaders, Lt Colonels in Tiger ranks were killed during the Vakarai mission.
At the dawn of the new year, the Tiger hold in Vakarai and Kathiraveli were gradually collapsing.
But, still the Tigers manned Three bunker lines. The troops finally decided to advance in to Tiger controlled area, they undid the Tiger forward defence line with the use of tank fire. The Tigers withdrew to the second bunker line from where they offered a stiff resistance to the advancing troops of the 6th Gemunu Watch.
The date was December 10. Young Captain Darshana Abeykoon led a platoon, comprising three eight man teams. Their mission was to attack the second defence line bunkers of the Tigers. But, the Tiger artillery fire had a heavy toll on the soldiers.
All three soldiers who carried radio sets were killed in the artillery fire. Communication was cut off with the command centre. The young Captain had no spare time for a second thought. He acted spontaneously, as he confessed to us last week. He led his team in a do or die mission, which turned to be a decisive assault in the operation. He jumped off the bunker he took over. A soldier jumped off with two disposable RPGs, firing at the two command bunkers of the Tigers, who were taken by surprise.
Captain Darshana`s colleagues described the raid was terrifying. Soldiers were running over the Tiger bunkers, surrounded by anti personnel mines amidst a rain of artillery shells.
Within a matter of minutes - they said it took five minutes- soldiers took control of the two command bunkers of the LTTE. That forced the Tigers to flee their well entrenched second bunker line. The Tigers gave up the third bunker line near the Panichchankerny Bridge, with a little resistance.
But, before the retreat, the Tigers blew up the Bridge. Six mines, each weighting 15 kg were planted on the Bridge. Two were diffused by the Army Engineers, who rebuilt the Bridge in 48 hours.
Meanwhile, the Special Forces Commandos crossed the river with out anyone`s knowledge. They advanced towards the Vakarai Hospital. They took control of the hospital and later the town without firing a single shot.
The LTTE did not offer a fight as the Special Forces advanced up to Verugal. Meanwhile Commandos consolidated the area from Ichchalampattu to the bank of the Verugal Aru.
Element of surprise
The element of surprise was part of the success of the entire military operation. As the Special forces advanced, the Tigers were on a frantic bid to escape. However, their escape routes had been cut off by the troops, who set ambush teams in the possible crossing points. This prevented the Tigers from towing their heavy artillery guns. The security forces later recovered two 152 mm artillery guns, one 120 mm mortar gun, one 37 mm cannon, twine cannon of 20 mm and a large cache of small arms and explosives.
Earlier reports said troops have found pieces of a 122 mm artillery gun. But, a senior military officer said it was a misidentification and that there were no evidence that the Tigers had used 122 mm guns.
The security forces had tested the empty shells,which the Tigers fired with the recovered guns. These shells were of 152 mm artillery and no evidence of the LTTE using 122 mm artillery has been found.
It is believed that these two guns were all what Tigers had in possession in the East other than several 120 mm mortars, which can cause equal destruction. 120 mm mortars are called `arti-mortar` by soldiers.
At least two 120 mm mortars had been destroyed in the air strikes earlier.
Early this week, the LTTE cadres attacked a bunker in the Vavunathivu security forces forward defence line, killing two soldiers. The attackers took the bodies of the two soldiers which were later handed over to the Army through the ICRC.
Reports
Following the attack, the security forces retaliated with a heavy volume of rockets. Casualties on the LTTE side is not known. The intercepted LTTE communications has said five cadres were killed.
This attack was viewed by the security forces commanders as a desperate attempt to keep morale up by the tigers. However there are reports of a concentration of LTTE cadres in the general area of Vavunathivu.
The reports indicate that the tigers have moved northwards from Ampara ...
the sri lankan special forces made a contribution to the world with special operations cum infantry battles with the vakarai battle...
the methods employed cannot be spelt out but lets just say that the operation was a unprecedented plan which no force in the world has ever tried or succeeded in doing...!
so we have made a contribution to the world...
sec def hon gotabaya rajapkse and lt gen sarath fonseka were the architects of this battle which the world or thr sri lankan theater has never seen before...
a method which will be taught in the worlds prestigious most military academies as 'the sri lankan' method...! something which all of us can be truly proud of...
we have made a contribution to the world of military sciences...!
Source - sunday observer
As far as fighting the separatist insurgency is concerned what Sri Lankan military planners were accustomed to was a big push in to the enemy territory, supported by heavy armours and tanks. Several brigades, sometimes even a division of soldiers were involved in the mission, which fought along the Main Supply Routes. Operation Riviresa which captured Jaffna and Operation Jayasikuru - abandoned after heavy casualties over the Alpha 9 highway- are two recent examples. They were of the conventional warfare. They had their success and failures. But, the nature of such operations risked soldiers heavily in to the indirect fire by the Tigers. 81mm mortar has been the main form of security forces casualties since the Operation Riviresa.
But, the military mission which successfully captured the last Tiger bastion in the East, Vakarai did not have any of those characteristics. It did not have a name tag either. It did not come out with daily casualty counts. Its very nature of implementation made it hard to seek political mileage - Indeed, the Rajapaksa Administration has restrained itself from politicising the military missions, an obvious shift from its predecessor, the Kumarathunga Administration.
But as Special Forces commandos and soldiers of 6 and 7 Gemunu Watch captured the coastal strip of Vakarai, Kathiravelu and Verugal, resulting in the collapse of the last strong hold of the LTTE in the East, the military mission suddenly made headlines.
Cache of arms
As far as the cache of arms recovered by the troops and the number of LTTE casualties concerned, the military mission is a one of the best success story. More about that later in the article.
Only a few knew when the military mission was launched on November 1, last year.
The mission had three main objectives: 1.Zero casualties to the civilians. 2. Minimum Casualties to the Security Forces 3. Maximum casualties to the enemy.
The mission was planned in order to achieve these triple objectives. Security Forces restrained its fire power, in most incidents where the civilians could be caught in indirect fire in the form of Multi-Barrel Rockets and artillery. Other than the tragedy in Vigneshwaran Vidyalam, Kathiravelu, where a misguided observatory rocket fire targeting a movement of a Tiger artillery gun fell near the IDP camp, the security forces almost succeeded minimising civilian casualties.
The second doctrine: Indirect fire has been the cause for the greater number of military casualties during the previous military operations. The concentration of a large number of troops in a smaller area made them easy victims of indirect fire. So the second doctrine intended to cut down casualties by indirect fire. Small group operations were the best form to avoid indirect fire.
Special Forces Commandos and Special Operation troops with the cache of weapons captured by the Tigers.
The third doctrine: Maximum casualties to the enemy intended to `destroy` the LTTE`s strength in the East. Past experience was that the Tigers could withdraw in the face of advancing troops and that later would regroup and attack. Had the troops opted for a conventional military operation in the coastal strip of Vakarai, the withdrawing Tigers could have plenty of room to flee the East, via jungle routes, possibly towing big guns with them. There were several past military missions launched to capture and consolidate Vakarai, all of them captured Vakarai in a matter of days. Though they captured the ground, they could not neutralise the enemy man power in significant numbers.
So the military planners decided on a gradual strangulation of the Tigers. The strategy was to delay the final decisive blow, till the Tigers strength is drastically reduced through covert and over attacks, almost all executed by the Special Forces Commandos and soldiers of 6 and 7 GW soldiers who trained in special operations, who operated in small teams deep inside enemy territory.
This Special Operations Infantry training was the brain child of Lt. Gen Sarath Fonseka, who marshalled the idea and trained several intakes when he was the Security Forces Commander, Jaffna.
The absence of a quick decisive blow gave temptation to the Tigers to hold on the ground. The LTTE on its part overestimated its clout and misjudged the military strategy and planned to fight a conventional war in its Eastern front.
The military strategy was of a multi-phased nature. As the first step, it intended to deny the freedom of movement inside Tiger controlled area for LTTE cadres in general and the leadership in particular. Special Force Commandos operating in small groups ambushed Tiger convoys.
In early November, the SF commandos sneaked through their forward defence lines in Kajuwatta. They concentrated their attacks on Karuvappalchanai and Madurankerny Kulam. Convoys of LTTE cadres were blown up in claymore explosions. Tiger administrative and communication centres were attacked. Their supply routes were cut off.
In the second leg of the mission, having disrupted the LTTE machinery in the area, SF commandos, moving from two directions - from Kajuwatta and Mahindapura attacked the Tiger positions in Trikonamadu and Kaddimuravikulam.
It was during that time, that a team of Commandos blew up the Double Cab of the second in Command in charge of the Tiger hierarchy in the East, Arivu in the South of Kathiravelu.
Casualties
According to military sources about 8 senior Tiger military leaders, Lt Colonels in Tiger ranks were killed during the Vakarai mission.
At the dawn of the new year, the Tiger hold in Vakarai and Kathiraveli were gradually collapsing.
But, still the Tigers manned Three bunker lines. The troops finally decided to advance in to Tiger controlled area, they undid the Tiger forward defence line with the use of tank fire. The Tigers withdrew to the second bunker line from where they offered a stiff resistance to the advancing troops of the 6th Gemunu Watch.
The date was December 10. Young Captain Darshana Abeykoon led a platoon, comprising three eight man teams. Their mission was to attack the second defence line bunkers of the Tigers. But, the Tiger artillery fire had a heavy toll on the soldiers.
All three soldiers who carried radio sets were killed in the artillery fire. Communication was cut off with the command centre. The young Captain had no spare time for a second thought. He acted spontaneously, as he confessed to us last week. He led his team in a do or die mission, which turned to be a decisive assault in the operation. He jumped off the bunker he took over. A soldier jumped off with two disposable RPGs, firing at the two command bunkers of the Tigers, who were taken by surprise.
Captain Darshana`s colleagues described the raid was terrifying. Soldiers were running over the Tiger bunkers, surrounded by anti personnel mines amidst a rain of artillery shells.
Within a matter of minutes - they said it took five minutes- soldiers took control of the two command bunkers of the LTTE. That forced the Tigers to flee their well entrenched second bunker line. The Tigers gave up the third bunker line near the Panichchankerny Bridge, with a little resistance.
But, before the retreat, the Tigers blew up the Bridge. Six mines, each weighting 15 kg were planted on the Bridge. Two were diffused by the Army Engineers, who rebuilt the Bridge in 48 hours.
Meanwhile, the Special Forces Commandos crossed the river with out anyone`s knowledge. They advanced towards the Vakarai Hospital. They took control of the hospital and later the town without firing a single shot.
The LTTE did not offer a fight as the Special Forces advanced up to Verugal. Meanwhile Commandos consolidated the area from Ichchalampattu to the bank of the Verugal Aru.
Element of surprise
The element of surprise was part of the success of the entire military operation. As the Special forces advanced, the Tigers were on a frantic bid to escape. However, their escape routes had been cut off by the troops, who set ambush teams in the possible crossing points. This prevented the Tigers from towing their heavy artillery guns. The security forces later recovered two 152 mm artillery guns, one 120 mm mortar gun, one 37 mm cannon, twine cannon of 20 mm and a large cache of small arms and explosives.
Earlier reports said troops have found pieces of a 122 mm artillery gun. But, a senior military officer said it was a misidentification and that there were no evidence that the Tigers had used 122 mm guns.
The security forces had tested the empty shells,which the Tigers fired with the recovered guns. These shells were of 152 mm artillery and no evidence of the LTTE using 122 mm artillery has been found.
It is believed that these two guns were all what Tigers had in possession in the East other than several 120 mm mortars, which can cause equal destruction. 120 mm mortars are called `arti-mortar` by soldiers.
At least two 120 mm mortars had been destroyed in the air strikes earlier.
Early this week, the LTTE cadres attacked a bunker in the Vavunathivu security forces forward defence line, killing two soldiers. The attackers took the bodies of the two soldiers which were later handed over to the Army through the ICRC.
Reports
Following the attack, the security forces retaliated with a heavy volume of rockets. Casualties on the LTTE side is not known. The intercepted LTTE communications has said five cadres were killed.
This attack was viewed by the security forces commanders as a desperate attempt to keep morale up by the tigers. However there are reports of a concentration of LTTE cadres in the general area of Vavunathivu.
The reports indicate that the tigers have moved northwards from Ampara ...
the sri lankan special forces made a contribution to the world with special operations cum infantry battles with the vakarai battle...
the methods employed cannot be spelt out but lets just say that the operation was a unprecedented plan which no force in the world has ever tried or succeeded in doing...!
so we have made a contribution to the world...
sec def hon gotabaya rajapkse and lt gen sarath fonseka were the architects of this battle which the world or thr sri lankan theater has never seen before...
a method which will be taught in the worlds prestigious most military academies as 'the sri lankan' method...! something which all of us can be truly proud of...
we have made a contribution to the world of military sciences...!
Source - sunday observer